INTRODUCTION
The stability of the banking sector is the cornerstone of a nation's economy. As banks are one of the most important actors in the financial network, the management of their portfolios makes them vulnerable to illiquidity and insolvency, especially because deposits are highly leveraged. Insolvencies in the banking sector can undermine the stability of the financial markets and the creditworthiness of the financial system as a whole. These risks were confirmed by the financial crisis of 2008, when European credit institutions suffered from the effects of investments on the US loan market.
Deposit Protection Schemes (DPSs), also known as Deposit Guarantee/Insurance Schemes, are funds set up with the goal of reimbursing depositors in the event of insolvency of their financial institution. By ensuring protection of small depositors, DPSs aim to avoid bank runs and thus enhance the stability of the financial sector; also, by ensuring the same level of protection within a country, they aim to avoid competition distortions within the banking system. DPSs are thus part of a country's financial safety net, which is composed of different key actors: the DPS, the prudential regulator and the supervisory authority, and the lender of last resort (for example, the State or the Central Bank). 1, 2 For the safety net to serve its purpose, the tasks of the different actors need to be clearly defined and implemented. Moreover, these actors should cooperate effectively in order to deal with a systemic crisis. 1 Within the European Union (EU), DPSs are in force in all Member States pursuant to Directive 94/19/EC. 3 Aimed at completing the single market, this Directive required minimum harmonisation of deposit protection rules across Member States, that is the establishment of a DPS in each Member State, the choice of a minimum level of protection for depositors (set in 1994 at h20 000) and some time constraints for depositors' repayment. At the same time, the Directive left Member States free to choose on a number of issues, as it is recognised that each country must consider what is the final goal of a DPS and what are the peculiar circumstances of the banking system in which the DPS is set up. 4, 5 For instance, each Member State can decide on the types of action the DPS can undertake (for example, optional preventive interventions and/or statutory repayments of depositors in case of failure), on the intervention procedure, on the way DPS collects financial resources, and on the interaction between the DPS and other competent authorities such as the Central Bank or the Banking Supervisory Authority (BSA). As a result, DPSs across EU Member States have developed in quite heterogeneous ways.
In [2005] [2006] , Directive 94/19/EC underwent a first review process, the results of which were summarised in a European Commission (EC) Communication. 6 The Communication identified a number of short-term improvements to the existing arrangements, to be adopted via self-regulatory agreements and without the need to make changes to the legislation implemented. EC also analysed the efficiency of EU DPSs to determine whether differences among procedures and rules for paying out to depositors might undermine fast and efficient banking crisis resolution. 7 The global banking crisis of 2008 once more opened the debate on the effectiveness of the Directive, as, in most of the EU countries, bank insolvencies could only be addressed through capital injections into the system by the Government. 8 This was the case for several banks within the EU, for example Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley in the United Kingdom, Fortis in Belgium and the Netherlands, and Hypo Real Estate in Germany. A detailed chronological list of events can be found in two reports by the Bank of England. 9, 10 As a quick response to the 2008 financial crisis, the EC proposed some amendments to the Directive in force, aiming to restore confidence in and proper functioning of the financial sector. 11 The Amending Directive (Directive 2009/14/EC), adopted in Spring 2009, increases the minimum coverage level from h20 000 to h50 000 (and possibly to h100 000 by the end of 2010), reduces the payout period from 3 months to 20 working days and discontinues coinsurance. 12, 13 In recent years, academics have also started to develop some research on the role and the goals of DPSs. Analysis of DPSs around the world can be found, for instance, in the work of Garcia and Demirgüc¸-Kunt et al. 14, 15 The role and consequences of explicit deposit protection have been the subject of debate in the literature. 16 More specifically, whether setting up a DPS actually enhances financial stability is still discussed in the paper of Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 17 whereas the positive impact of Government provisions regarding deposit insurance on the demand for liquidity is discussed in the paper of Diamond and Dybvig. 18 Moreover, despite the fact that the International Monetary Fund has endorsed a limited form of deposit protection as a best practice, 19 it is well known that the presence of a DPS could encourage risk-taking by the banks, thus introducing moral hazard. 20, 21 As outlined in the work of Lee and Kwok, most of the existing literature on deposit insurance tend, in general, to be confined to a discussion of the reform proposals and risk-related premium assessment methodologies. 22, 23 The present article is more oriented to discussing practical issues arising from the procedures adopted by EU DPSs in facing banking difficulties, such as the procedures to be followed in case of intervention, the extent of resources available to EU DPSs and their potential capability to cope with banking failures of given sizes. Using quantitative and qualitative data collected among EU DPSs, it shows the low level of harmonisation in the procedures adopted, which might result in a reduction of their effectiveness. In particular, by analysing historical payouts, it highlights the issue of the capability of EU DPSs to handle situations of different types, ranging from the default of a bank of small/medium size to the resolution of failures of wider dimensions, for example failures that occurred during the 2008 crisis. To this end, the resources available to EU DPSs are investigated and compared with the costs incurred in coping with historical failures. In addition, where a repayment is made, the time needed to reimburse customers is also very relevant, in particular from a depositor's point of view. The study investigates the time needed to repay depositors in past defaults by assessing the percentage of repayments performed within the time limits laid down by the Directive.
There are two main sources of data used in this article: the first one is the survey, which is analysed in the report on DPSs efficiency released by the EC; the second one is a survey by the EC conducted in response to the crisis, whose findings are currently unpublished. 7, 24 The article is structured as follows. In the next section, an overview of the Directive is given. The section following this details the types of procedures adopted by EU DPSs in case of intervention and briefly comments on potential problems arising from the low level of harmonisation enforced by the Directive. The section after that focuses on the financial resources available to EU DPSs and introduces two measures to describe the size of their funds. The subsequent section discusses in quantitative terms the 10 biggest reimbursements of depositors that have occurred in each Member State after the adoption of the Directive. Appropriately rescaled costs are compared with available resources via the measures introduced to assess the capacity of current funds to cope with past reimbursements. The penultimate section discusses the issue of consumers' awareness and the promptness of payouts and the final section draws some conclusions.
EU SITUATION
Before starting to discuss in detail several specific features of EU DPSs, this section gives a brief overview of Directive 94/19/EC as it stood before Autumn 2008. More detailed information can be found, for example, in the paper by Cariboni et al or in the report by the Joint Research Centre. 25, 26 The last part of this section focuses on the consequences of the 2008 crisis for deposit protection, starting with actions taken at Member States level to face the lack of confidence in the banking systems and leading to the Amending Directive.
Directive 94/19/EC introduced only a few harmonised rules, for example:
K It requires EU Member States to ensure that one or more schemes exist on their territory. K It enforces a minimum level of protection for depositors, set at h20 000.
K It introduces a 3-month limit for repayments with the possibility of extending it twice, up to a maximum of 9 months.
The lack of more standardised guidelines was because of historical reasons, mainly the fact that, although in many countries DPSs had been in place for several decades before the Directive, other Member States only set up a protection system in the transitional period following the EC Directive. For this reason, implementation of the rules was left to the Member States, which were free to choose how to finance their DPSs, how to invest their funds and how to refinance them in case of need. Furthermore, each Member State could decide on the type of action the DPS can undertake, allowing optional preventive interventions or limiting it to statutory payouts to depositors in case of failure. All these 'degrees of freedom' introduced wide heterogeneity among Member States, as discussed in the report by the Joint Research Centre. 26 For instance, the number of operating schemes varies from one country to another. Currently, there are 39 DPSs in the 27 Member States (see Table 1 ): in some countries, there are more than one DPS, dealing with specific sectors of the banking market (savings banks, public banks, cooperative banks and so on). 27 The Directive only requires there be a DPS in operation in each Member State, without specifying the way it should be financed, which is maybe one of the most discussed differences among EU DPSs. In EU, 16 countries have ex ante systems, where levies are collected on a regular basis in order to build a reserve fund, whereas six countries (Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the United Kingdom) collect contributions from member banks only in case of interventions: these are described as ex post systems. In the remaining five Member States (Denmark, Cyprus, Malta, Poland and Romania), the DPSs' funding is hybrid, that is it combines ex ante and ex post components. 28 As discussed in detail in the 'Financial Resources' section, the amount of resources set aside by ex ante DPSs also varies widely among countries, depending on historical payouts, on the structure of the banking system and especially on the role of the scheme in a country.
Another factor to be taken into consideration is the level of coverage of the deposit protection. Before the 2008 financial crisis, around half of the Member States opted to cover only up to the obligatory minimum amount of h20 000, whereas other Member States chose to cover different amounts, up to a maximum of around h103 000 in Italy. Member States also chose whether to cover certain types of deposits, explicitly mentioned in the Directive (see Article 7(2)), such as deposits by insurance undertakings, by the Government and by pension funds. Here too, extreme situations can be found, ranging from countries where no exclusions are in force (Finland) to countries implementing all possible types of exclusions (Belgium, Germany and Austria). 25 Another element of heterogeneity was the application of coinsurance (see Article 7(4)): in order to avoid moral hazards, DPSs could lower the level of coverage to 90 per cent, so that depositors would keep part of the risk in their own hands. This meant that, in certain Member States, the real level of guarantee was lower than the level of coverage.
The implementation, among Member States, of different coverage levels, different types of exclusions and different coinsurance rules introduced distortions within a banking system in which credit institutions from different Member States coexist. To avoid such competition problems, the Directive enforced the application of the topping-up principle, which imposes the same type of guarantee to depositors, irrespective of the origin of the credit institution.
Finally, regarding the time taken to repay depositors in the event of a failure, the Directive introduced a clear deadline for the scheme to complete the procedure (see Article 10(1)), starting from the so-called trigger event, that is the moment in time when the competent authorities make the determination that deposits are unavailable. However, at the same time, the Directive remained vague about the period in which a depositor can submit a claim and the time between the submission of the claim and the due repayment. This will be discussed in greater detail in the section 'Consumer Confidence and Promptness of Repayments'.
As a reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, the Amending Directive was adopted in March 2009. With the aim of building more confidence in the market and meeting depositors' needs more fully, the Amending Directive The Amending Directive represents the latest measures taken by the EC to improve deposit insurance regulation. However, it is expected that the EC will review the entire Directive in the years ahead. For instance, the EC is currently considering promoting ex ante schemes, as also stressed in the Report by the de Larosière Group, as 'they are better to foster confidence and help avoiding procyclical effects resulting from banks having to pay into the schemes at a time where they are already in difficulty'. 8 
PROCEDURES
This section describes aspects of DPSs' activities across EU Member States: the types of action allowed, the institutions involved in the crisis management and the events triggering the DPS activation.
In many cases, DPSs have a multiple role. Not only do they have statutory obligations to repay depositors in the event of a failure (as laid down in Directive 94/19/EC), but around 40 per cent of the Member States' national laws allow the schemes to perform other actions such as preventive interventions (see Table 2 ).
For preventive actions, the Board of DPS often acts on the basis of a monitoring system developed to assess the risk of the DPS In IE extraordinary contributions are foreseen but cannot be estimated. members, and different types of risk measures are used. No common rules on starting a preventive procedure exist but very often 'the least cost principle' is applied. This means that a DPS will start an intervention preventively if the expected costs are lower than the costs of the failure itself. In this way, the institutions in charge try to ensure the stability of the financial system and the banking sector.
In most EU countries, DPS will not act on its own in the decision-making process and strategy development, although it would seem most effective to have a totally independent DPS. 4 For instance, one or more of the following institutions can also be involved in the initiation of a payout by DPS or in the decision that DPS should perform a preventive intervention: the Central Bank, the BSA, a competent Court and/or the Economics/Finance Ministry.
Another important factor is the payout procedure in the event of a failure, where different actors might be involved (see Table 3 ). In general, the event triggering the activation of a DPS is the declaration of the unavailability of deposits by a competent authority. Directive 94/19/EC enforced a time limit of 21 days for the competent authority to determine that a credit institution is unable to repay deposits (Article 1(3)) and a 3-month period (possibly extended twice) for DPS to pay duly verified claims (Article 10(1) and (2)). The Amending Directive reduces these time limits to 5 and 20 working days, respectively. However, the current time frames and the steps to be followed in a failure resolution vary widely across Member States, depending not only on the interface between the authorities involved but also, for instance, on the overlap between bankruptcy law and DPS regulation.
More than one-third of the DPSs have complete powers in all steps of the payout procedure. For the remaining schemes, other entities are involved, such as the liquidator of the failing bank, the Central Bank, the Supervisory Authority or the failing bank itself. Their corresponding powers vary considerably from one Member State to another. For instance, in some countries, the defaulting bank interacts with the DPS in order to handle the payout. In many cases, the defaulting bank is in charge of collecting/verifying claims/data or applying set-off rules. When another existing bank is involved, its role has mainly to do with the payout of depositors. For a few DPSs, the Central Bank is involved in some steps of the payout process. Note that no Member State is created for the purpose of the payout process. In only some Member States, the liquidator of the failing bank supports the DPS in some stages of the payout, especially related to the collection/verification of claims/data. Finally, the powers of the Supervisory Authority are usually restricted to data/claim collection/ verification. Table 3 provides, for each country, the responsible authorities for each step of the intervention procedure.
Although the involvement of more than one actor could introduce delays and ambiguities, it appears in practice that the different parties in charge maintain a good balance of powers (see also data on payout times in the section 'Consumer Confidence and Promptness of Repayments'). The existence of such diverse procedures makes the actual role of DPSs in the financial safety net less evident. As a consequence, the question arises whether more harmonised rules, at the EU level, are needed to enhance the effectiveness of the DPSs' role in maintaining stability of the financial markets.
Some attention should be given to the possible involvement of the State in the event of big failures or systemic crises. Where no preventive actions are taken by DPS, the Government can still intervene as a last resort before a trigger event if, for instance, the bank plays a strategic role in the banking system or if the stability of the financial sector is undermined. However, the exact role of the State when intervening as a last resort remains vague in the Directive. During the 2008 turmoil, EU Governments often intervened to avoid banking failures and interventions 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
The choice of an adequate funding system is of crucial importance to ensure that a DPS functions effectively: if a scheme were not capable of coping with the reimbursement of claims because of insufficiency of funds, the safety net might lose credibility and the costs might increase significantly. 4, 29 In this section, the financial resources available to EU DPSs are investigated. As for ex post DPSs, funds collection is completely dependent on the occurrence of a bank default, this section will focus on the schemes showing complete/partial ex ante features.
As already outlined, the size of the funds accumulated by ex ante DPSs can vary widely among Member States (see also Table 2 ). Two measures are proposed in order to gain a picture of the readiness of a DPS to face potential interventions. A first measure, called coverage ratio, looks at the amount of resources put aside by ex ante DPSs rescaled by the amount of deposits protected by the scheme (which will be referred to as the amount of eligible deposits as in the paper by Cariboni et al. 25 This ratio will be discussed in the subsection 'Coverage ratio'.
Besides the size of the fund, other factors should be examined in order to gain a complete picture of the resources that each DPS can call on if necessary. Two other aspects that need to be taken into account are the possibility to raise additional contributions (up to Note that for each country data of different DPS is merged if DPS statutes are equal within the country.
a certain pre-determined maximum), and to levy 'extraordinary' premiums. In more than 80 per cent of ex ante EU Member States (see Table 2 ), schemes can levy extraordinary contributions from members in case of need: this option can be particularly useful in order to cope with low-cost payouts, avoiding the financial burden of taking out a loan. At the same time, 70 per cent of EU ex ante Member States have, in their statutes/by-laws, an explicitly set maximum limit for annual contributions (see Table 2 ): the underlying reason is to keep the contribution level not too high for members, in order to avoid the contagion phenomena. This is because, it is believed that members who are already in financial difficulty would be put in a worse situation if they were asked to contribute to the solution of other members' failures. It should also be noted that, among the schemes that are funded ex post, there might be a 'virtual fund', earmarked or set aside by the members, but not explicitly collected by the DPS, which has to be made available in case of need. In order to account for all types of resources potentially obtained from DPS members, a second measure named resource ratio is introduced in the subsection 'Resource ratio'. In addition to the resources that the DPS can obtain from its members, the possibility of borrowing money must also be taken into account. Only in six EU Member States do schemes have explicit rules in their statute, which prohibit them from borrowing either from institutional sources (Government, Central Bank) or on the free market, whereas all other schemes are allowed to ask for a loan (see Table 2 ). In particular, in most cases (around 80 per cent of DPSs that are allowed to ask for a loan) there are no explicit limitations on the amount of funds that can be borrowed, thus introducing a theoretically infinite capability to collect money. However, as this option seems unrealistic, in practice, a limit on borrowing must be considered as in force, despite the absence of an explicit limit in the legislation. For example, a ceiling on annual contributions introduces a limit to the capability of repaying a loan. 30 Before detailing the two measures, it is worth noting that the debate on how much funds would be adequate for a DPS is still open. Some ex ante DPSs do actually set a target level for their funds (see Table 2 ). However, in practice, there is no recognised methodology to evaluate the adequacy of the amount of resources before a failure event. For instance, the target could be calculated as a fixed share of the amount of eligible deposits. Moreover, where this approach is applied, the shares used vary by an order of magnitude among EU countries (from 0.2 per cent to 5 per cent). Some authors put emphasis on the necessity to link the amount of funds to the DPS loss distribution.
31,32
Coverage ratio
The first ratio describes the resources owned by the DPS to face potential interventions. In order to compare data from different countries, the size of the market in which the DPS operates should be taken into account. For this reason, the fund is rescaled by the amount of eligible deposits:
Coverage ratio ¼ Size of fund Total amount of eligible deposits
: ð1Þ
The ratio has been calculated for each ex ante DPS for the year 2007 and the results are presented in Figure 2 . 33 The results show that, on average, ex ante EU DPSs could face the failure of a member covering approximately 0.73 per cent of the market of eligible deposits. Schemes in Eastern Europe show stronger ex ante features than EU-15 DPSs, the corresponding average ratios being, respectively, 0.92 per cent and 0.51 per cent. Coverage ratios might seem very low, all being below 2.5 per cent, probably reflecting the underlying assumption that the DPS would have to handle the failure of a single member of small size. This assumption of isolated defaults clearly revealed its limitations during the 2008 crisis.
While discussing the financial resources available, the question of how they are managed or invested is also very relevant. Most of the funds (almost 90 per cent of cases) are directly managed by DPSs. Only in very few cases are funds provided by ring-fenced reserves or partially earmarked by members. With regard to the way ex ante DPSs manage their resources, in all cases but one (in which money is put on an account with the Central Bank), funds are invested. For the great majority, funds are invested in national and/or EU bonds or similar government securities and there are significant cases in which schemes resort to short-term deposits. Whenever more risky financial products are allowed, strict limitations (for example, a minimum rating for the instruments) are explicitly laid down in statutes/ by-laws in order to limit the risk in the DPS' portfolio. This approach could be strengthened by specifying common and harmonised investment rules and risk constraints.
Resource ratio
This second proposed ratio is quite similar to the coverage ratio. The difference lies in the fact that, in this case, the maximum amount that could be made available in case of need is considered, instead of limiting the analysis to the financial resources currently owned by DPS:
Resource ratio ¼
Maximum amount of available resources
Total amount of eligible deposits :
The maximum amount of available resources includes the fund, the theoretical maximum amount of standard contributions and potential extraordinary contributions. Moreover, for ex post funded schemes, virtual funds are taken into account. 34 Note that, as already discussed, for the great majority of countries, there is no explicit limitation to the amount of money that may be borrowed. For this reason, borrowing is not included in this analysis, a notable difference with the approach taken in report from the Joint Research Centre. 7 In order to produce an immediate comparison between current funds and potential resources, Figure 3 shows, for each Member State, the resource ratio and the corresponding coverage ratio for the year 2007.
LT EE BG PT RO PL LV ES SE FI GR HU CZ BE IE DK MT FR CY
The resource ratio clearly lies higher than the coverage ratio and the EU average even exceeds 1 per cent. It should be noted that, for this ratio, three additional ex post countries are included (Italy, Slovenia and the United Kingdom), as they were able to provide precise information on the size of their virtual funds. 34 Also the resource ratio of Slovakia is plotted. Figure 3 shows that, for this ratio too, the situation is fairly heterogeneous from one country to another, ranging from cases in which the maximum amount of resources doubles the fund (for example Romania, Finland) to cases in which the additional collection is not significant (for example Belgium, Sweden).
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Taking all these possible resources into account, the ratio clearly increases but current values still do not demonstrate that DPSs are adequately prepared to handle multiple failures.
HISTORICAL PAYOUTS
This section is based on data on the most significant DPS payouts that occurred in the EU over a 13-year period, from 1995 to 2008, including some of the failures that took place during the 2008 financial turmoil. The focus is on those cases in which DPSs intervened after a member's failure to repay depositors. In order to compare and classify failures that occurred in different years and in different markets, the following measure, which will be referred to as the intensity ratio, is defined:
LT EE BG PT RO PL LV ES SE FI GR HU CZ BE IE DK MT FR CY UK IT SI SK
Intensity ratio ¼ Under the assumption that within EU all countries follow a similar pattern, the ratios obtained can be used to construct the distribution of the intensities of the defaults. The distribution could then be used to forecast the size of a future failure or to check the readiness of a DPS to face a potential payout. The intensity ratio can, in fact, be directly compared with the coverage ratio and the resource ratio in order to investigate whether DPS' resources would be sufficient to tackle the effects of a failure. Figure 4 presents the empirical cumulative distribution function for the intensity ratio based on the EC data set. For comparison, the figure contains also the EU average coverage and resource ratio. Using the results, it can be concluded that more than 85 per cent of all failures had an intensity ratio, falling below the average coverage ratio (and almost 90 per cent for the resource ratio). Even the fund with the smallest coverage ratio (0.01 per cent) would have been able to cover 35 per cent of the interventions that occurred.
It should be noted that information on DPS interventions during the financial turmoil is not complete because, at the time of data gathering, several payout procedures were still ongoing. In fact, only around 10 per cent of the failures, presented in Figure 4 , occurred in 2008 and many of them relate to the failure of tiny credit unions in the United Kingdom. It has to be noted that in some cases, guarantee costs were only partially covered by DPS. For instance, in the case of the failure of Bradford & Bingley plc. (2008), where the UK DPS contributed £14billion, the value of the intensity ratio is around 1.5 per cent. However, as almost one quarter of the total costs were covered by the State, which guaranteed the entire amount of retail deposits above the £35 000 limit in place at the time of failure and all whole sale deposits, the true value of the intensity ratio would be higher. 36 Finally, as already stressed before, it should be mentioned that, in many countries, banks in difficulty were rescued by state interventions, whose size is often comparable to several points of the GDP of a country.
CONSUMER CONFIDENCE AND PROMPTNESS OF REPAYMENTS
From a consumer's point of view, more than the choice of the level of coverage, key factors to avoid bank runs are the public awareness that deposits are protected by a DPS and the time required to effect the repayment. The guarantee of repayment alone is not sufficient, as many costumers need the money deposited for their everyday life. Clearly, if someone is not aware of the existence of a DPS, he/she cannot take it into account when deciding to keep money in a bank account. A recent study by the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) states: 'One factor that may have contributed to the queues outside branches of Northern Rock in September 2007 was that many consumers were unaware of the existence of a financial compensation scheme and how it operated'.
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The International Association of Deposit Insurers has developed guidance for effectively promoting public awareness of deposit insurance systems, recognising that the ultimate goal of a public awareness programme is to enhance the effectiveness of the scheme. 38 Despite the fact that the issue of public awareness is receiving more and more attention, extremely few quantitative data have been collected so far. The UK FSA produced a report on public awareness of financial regulation reporting that around 44 per cent of the UK population was not aware of the existence of FSA as a financial regulator. 39, 40 Besides the fact that consumers might or might not be aware that a DPS is guaranteeing their money, another critical issue is depositors' confidence that the repayment will be accomplished in a reasonable time. The payout delay issue received particular attention by EC both in the Directive review process started in 2005 and in the Amending Directive.
The 1994 Directive specified a maximum of 21 days for the competent authorities to determine that a bank is unable to conclude a requested payment (called a trigger event), starting from the moment a payment has not been performed (Article 1(3) ). Next, the Directive set a 3-month limit within which a DPS had to pay depositors, starting from the trigger event (Article 10(1)). The Directive also gave DPSs the possibility to ask twice for an extension of a further 3 months, leading to a possible maximum payout deadline of 9 months from the trigger event (Article 10(2)). The Amending Directive reduces the 21 days to 5 days and the 3 months to 20 days and allows a single extension under specific circumstances.
Although these limits are very precise, the Directive and the Amending Directive do not say anything about the time given to submit a claim (when mandatory, see Table 2 ) and do not put any constraint on the period of time between the submission of the claim and the DPS repayment, which might be more significant from the consumer's point of view. Moreover, the Directive stated that the time of arrival of claims cannot be used to refuse repayment (Article 10(3)). Clearly, this rule conflicts with the maximum period set in the Directive. Some Member States tackle this situation by putting a maximum time horizon for the submission of a claim, whereas other countries allow a very long, even unlimited, submission period.
On the basis of the results of the EC surveys, conclusions can be drawn on the payout times in past bank failures. The results are summarised in Figure 5 , in which the amount (top plot) and number (bottom plot) of deposits repaid after 3-6-9 months are plotted. 41 On average, 72 per cent of the total number of deposits were repaid within 3 months, corresponding to an amount of around 93 per cent of the total amount covered. These amounts increase, after 9 months, to an average of 82 per cent of the total number of deposits with a total amount of around 97 per cent.
Although the percentage of the number of unrepaid deposits seems significant (18 per cent of the total), its importance can be minimised as it corresponds to only 3 per cent of the total amount of deposits. This confirms the assumption that many depositors with very little amounts of money on their bank accounts did not claim for reimbursement.
It has to be noted that these results only give a picture of how efficiently the Directive is working from the regulator's point of view, that is they measure the performance of the DPSs in repaying depositors within the time limit set by the legislation. From a consumer's point view, on the other hand, the problem arises not at the time of the trigger event but from the moment that the money is not accessible.
There could be a number of reasons for the scheme to request for an extension: IT problems, delays in accessing data, unavailability funds, appeals introduced by the shareholders and so on. Very little data on these issues are currently available. With regard to the delay in accessing data, DPSs in 10 out of 27 Member States can access data from their members periodically or on request, whereas in the remaining EU countries the schemes receive information only after the competent authorities declare that a failure has occurred (see Table 2 ). Another issue has to do with the quality of data received by the DPSs. The 2008 report commissioned from Ernst & Young by the UK FSA and the UK DPS proposed a number of methods (such as data cleansing, eligibility account flagging, creation of a single customer view, that is the identification of the complete position of each customer) to improve the quality of data and speed up the compensation procedure towards a target of 7 days. 42 Depending on the scenario chosen, the study shows that total estimated setup and maintenance costs for the industry are rather high, ranging from £0.5billion to £1billion.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has investigated the effectiveness of DPSs in EU countries more than 10 years after the introduction of specific legislation on guarantee funds. The main idea behind the EU Directive was to provide consumers with a safety net for their deposits, thus improving their trust in the financial system.
On the basis of the data collected among European DPSs, the analysis has shown that approaches are currently not harmonised across countries. The investigation has focused on three crucial aspects of the schemes' functioning, namely the procedures applied in case of intervention, the amount of available resources and the promptness of depositor repayment in case of a bank failure.
Concerning the procedures in case of intervention, data have revealed a range of very different practices adopted by the schemes, varying from countries where the system works only as a pay box in case of bankruptcy, to situations in which schemes are allowed to intervene in order to prevent banking failures. These very diverse approaches are probably not the most efficient, and they do not help in clarifying the actual role of DPSs in the overall European financial safety net. Moreover, although the responsibility of the Governments in handling banking crises remains ambiguous in the EU legislation, in several circumstances, their intervention proved to be the only way of resolving problematic situations. In this view, clarifying the relative functions of all the actors involved in the resolution of a banking crisis might improve and increase the stakeholders' confidence in a country's safety net.
With regard to funds available to the schemes, as the current legislation sets no specific rule, resources vary considerably from one country to another, both in terms of the funding mechanism adopted and in terms of accessible resources. The analysis has introduced two quantitative measures in order to evaluate the adequacy of current and potentially available funds, and to compare them with the costs of historical reimbursements. Although the capability of ex post systems remains uncertain, for ex ante schemes, the results have demonstrated that, in the great majority of cases, funds are sufficient to face interventions of small size, for example the bankruptcy of a credit institution covering less than 1 per cent of the national market of deposits. In the event of multiple failures or interventions of wider dimension, like those that occurred in 2008, most of the schemes would be unable to handle alone the expenditures and thus to protect consumers.
Finally, regarding the issue of the DPSs' readiness to repay depositors, the data set has confirmed the capability of the schemes to cope with the 21-day and 3-month rules enforced at European level by Directive 94/19/EC. It remains an open question whether DPSs will be able to cope with the more stringent constraints introduced by the 2009 Amending Directive (5 and 20 working days) and whether this reduction will improve the confidence of consumers and thus help in controlling possible bank runs during critical periods.
